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Do Poachers make Harsh Gamekeepers?  
 Attitudes to Tax Evasion and to Benefit Fraud. 
 
John Cullis, Philip Jones, Alan Lewis, Cinzia Castiglioni and Edoardo Lozza 1 
Departments of Economics and Psychology, University of Bath and Università Cattolica, Milan 
 
Abstract 
In neoclassical economics the decision to evade tax is analyzed in the same way as the decision to 
commit benefit fraud. Both decisions depend on the net expected utility that a ‘representative 
individual’ will derive from the gamble. If the financial loss a community experiences when there is 
tax evasion is equal to the financial loss experienced when there is benefit fraud, there is no reason 
to expect any difference in individuals’ attitudes towards these crimes. However, in practice, 
individuals are far more condemnatory of benefit fraud than of tax evasion. Prospect theory is 
applied to explain this difference of attitude as well as why individuals are more likely to commit tax 
evasion than benefit fraud. Moreover, when comparing attitudes and behavior towards public 
finance crimes in different countries, the salience of the public finances in individuals’ lives, together 
with the perceived prevalence of illegal behaviors, is important.  A comparison of attitudes in Italy 
and in the UK indicates that Italians are more likely to more heavily punish these crimes and to 
commit these crimes.  The present study sheds insight when explaining why ‘gamekeepers’ who call 
for the harshest punishments are the individuals who are more likely to act as ‘poachers’ 
themselves. There is a distinction between what individuals wish for themselves in a ‘private-person’ 
role and what they wish for others in a ‘public-citizen’ role – would-be poachers are harsh 
gamekeepers.   
 
JEL Classification: D03; H2; H3; H5; H26; K42 
 
PsycINFO classification: 3040; 2340 
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1. Introduction 
In neoclassical economics, tax evasion and benefit fraud are analyzed as gambles (Allingham and 
Sandmo 1972; Yaniv 1986). When deciding whether to commit tax evasion and when deciding 
whether to commit benefit fraud, individuals assess the net expected utility they will derive if they 
commit these crimes.  As Halla and Schneider (2014:412) note, “… tax evasion and benefit fraud are 
almost identical in the standard neoclassical model of compliance”.  If individuals experience the 
same financial loss from benefit fraud as from tax evasion, there is no reason to assume that their 
perceptions and attitude to these crimes will differ. However, in many academic papers and in the 
popular press, attitudes to these two crimes are very different. Individuals are far more 
condemnatory of benefit fraud.2 
In this paper the objective is to explain this and other differences in attitudes to public finance 
crimes. The paper sets out to compare the way citizens view the loss they experience when there is 
benefit fraud with the way they view the loss they experience when there is tax evasion. The 
intention is to apply prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) to compare individuals’ 
subjective values when they experience the same financial loss from benefit fraud and from tax 
evasion. Barberis (2013) argues that: "There are areas of economics where prospect theory has not 
been applied very extensively, even though it has the potential to offer useful insights. Public 
finance, health economics and macroeconomics are three such fields…". Here, prospect theory is 
applied to compare individuals’ attitudes to these public finance crimes. 
In the next section of the paper a distinction is drawn between individuals placed in a ‘public- 
citizen’ role and individuals placed in a ‘private-person’ role when subjective losses are compared 
with reference to the distinctive value function employed in prospect theory. If individuals 
experience the same financial loss, why are they more disapproving of benefit fraud than of tax 
evasion? If individuals are more condemnatory of benefit fraud, are they more likely to commit tax 
evasion than to commit benefit fraud?  Are there differences in attitudes in different countries?  
Section three of the paper describes the questionnaire survey that was employed to provide 
empirical insight into these questions in Italy and in the UK. Responses to this questionnaire survey 
are analyzed in section four. Conclusions and policy implications are discussed in the final section of 
the paper. The questions posed in this paper are reminiscent of the roles individuals play when they 
act as ‘gamekeepers’ (assessing the ‘seriousness’ and consequent penalties for different public 
finance crimes) and when they act as ‘poachers’ (willingness to commit these crimes themselves). 
 
2.  A ‘Behavioural’ Analysis of Attitudes to Tax Evasion and to Benefit Fraud  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that individuals’ subjective value of changes (in income or 
in wealth) depend on the way changes are framed.  Drawing on a well-established experimental-
economics literature, they argued that individuals are far more sensitive to changes that are coded 
as ‘losses’.  The difference in the subjective values they attach to changes coded as ‘losses’ 
                                                          
2Houghton (1979:91, quoted in Thomas 1992: 119) suggests that: “Tax-dodging is like the common cold – 
prevalent: no certain cure; no cause for alarm, but often seems worse than it is.”, However Campbell is clear 
that ‘“Fraud is like VD”. “If you have got it you don’t talk about it” but “left to fester, it becomes a cancer: not 
so much VD, but more like the aids of the economic system.”’  (Bose and Gunn 1989:233 quoted in Thomas 
1992: 202).   
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(compared to the subjective values they attach to changes coded as ‘gains’) determines the 
distinctive shape of the value function employed in prospect theory. 
With evidence that an individual will be far more willing to take risk to avoid a ‘loss’ than to 
secure a ‘gain’, the value function increases at a decreasing rate over ‘gains’ and decreases at a 
decreasing rate over ‘losses’. The value function is concave in ‘gains’ (in a +ve, +ve quadrant) and 
convex in ‘losses’ (in a -ve,-ve quadrant), but the value function is not symmetrical. It is much 
steeper in the -ve,-ve quadrant. The shape of the value function is illustrated in Figure 1.  In Figure 1, 
v(U) is the value function of individual U and v(I) is the value function of individual I.  In each case the 
value function displays the properties that indicate that there is ‘loss aversion’. 
[Insert Figure 1 near here] 
When applying prospect theory, Barberis (2013: 178) comments that: “… in any given context, it 
is often unclear how to define what a gain or a loss is, not least because Kahneman and Tversky 
offered relatively little guidance on how the reference point is determined”.  The reference point 
(for a ‘gain’ and for a ‘loss’) is usually located at the origin. In Figure 1 the reference point is at the 
origin; individuals U and I code ‘losses’ and ‘gains’ with reference to the status quo. They code 
benefit fraud and tax evasion differently when experiencing the same financial loss.  In Figure 1, 
subjective values are reported on the y axis and the change in finance is reported on the x axis.  
First, we focus on how the individual views these crimes as an honest observer in a ‘public-
citizen’ role. As Barberis (2013) notes, prospect theory was developed to analyze risky choices but, in 
this situation, the external observer takes no risk at all. While the theory was developed to analyze 
risky choices, Thaler (1980), amongst others, has shown that it can be applied to analyze the 
subjective values of individuals who take no risk at all.  
A second consideration is that prospect theory was developed to compare subjective values, 
while this paper focuses on differences in individuals’ attitudes. In this paper the implicit assumption 
is that individuals’ attitudes (to benefit fraud and to tax evasion) are informed by individuals’ 
assignment of subjective values to these crimes. This assumption does not imply that individuals’ 
subjective values will only depend on financial loss. In Figure 1, the value function of individual I 
differs from the value function of individual U because I attaches greater salience to fiscal 
compliance.  The social norms, that influence individuals’ perceptions of action, are also relevant 
when comparing subjective values (Cullis and Jones, 2009).  
In the first instance, the intention is to compare an individual’s attitude to benefit fraud and to 
tax evasion. Later in the paper, the intention is to compare attitudes across individuals. Using Figure 
1 it is suggested that: 
(i) An individual is more condemnatory of benefit fraud than of tax evasion. 
An important consideration is the reference point of the observer. Initially, this is the current 
status of the ‘public purse’ from the ‘public-citizen’ point of view. With this reference point, benefit 
fraud takes revenue out of the ‘public purse’. With loss aversion, individuals code benefit fraud as a 
‘loss’. However, tax evasion reduces the additional revenue that would increase the ‘public purse’. 
Tax evasion is likely to be coded as a ‘foregone gain’.  
With ‘loss aversion’, individuals’ attitudes to these crimes will differ systematically. In Figure 1, 
the financial loss from benefit fraud (0-bf1) is equal to the financial loss from tax evasion (0-te1) that 
is coded as foregone gain. As tax evasion is coded as a foregone gain, the subjective value of the 
foregone gain from tax evasion for individual U (0-ve(U) at point 1) is lower than the subjective value 
of the loss from benefit fraud (0-vf(U)at point 3). Similarly, individual I ‘s subjective value of the 
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foregone gain from tax evasion (0-ve(I) at point 2) is lower than the subjective value of the loss from 
benefit fraud (0-vf(I) at point 4). Failure to add to the ‘public purse’ (a foregone gain) is not 
considered as bad as a conspiracy to take resources out of the ‘public purse’.  3 
(ii) Individuals call for higher punishments for benefit fraud than for tax evasion. 
A corollary of (i) is that each ‘public-citizen’ will be willing to take sterner measures to avoid the 
loss of revenue from benefit fraud, than to avoid an equal loss of revenue from tax evasion. Also (as 
‘gamekeepers’) each ‘public-citizen’ is more likely to report ‘benefit cheats’ to the authorities than to 
report ‘tax dodgers’ to the authorities. 
(iii)  Individuals are more likely to commit tax evasion than benefit fraud. 
A third observation is that when individuals are asked to consider whether they would commit 
benefit fraud, or tax evasion, their reference point will be their own personal income (instead of the 
‘public purse’). That is, a switch from a ‘public-citizen’ to a ‘private-person’ point of view may occur 
(from a broader ‘citizen’ point of view to a narrower instrumental perspective). While it is extremely 
difficult for individuals to estimate the revenue in the ‘public purse’ if everyone acts honestly, 
individuals are able to gauge their own personal income if they act honestly (e.g. see Kirchler et al. 
2009). When asked about their attitudes to benefit fraud and tax evasion (as ‘victims’ of these 
crimes), they condemn benefit fraud. But what happens when they switch from ‘victims’ to potential 
‘authors’ of these crimes? As Figure 1 illustrates, from the ‘private-person’ point of view of 
taxpayers, tax evasion is coded as an ‘avoided loss’, since they try to prevent an institution from 
taking the money they earned for themselves. On the other hand, benefit fraud is now coded as a 
potential ‘gain’ (with reference to ‘own honest income’), since they are cheating ‘the system’ to get 
money they are not entitled to. Of course as opposed to the ‘public-citizen’ role the ‘private-person’ 
role does involve contemplating risk. Given the shape of the value function individuals should be 
more inclined to be risk taking to prevent a loss as opposed to being risk averse in securing a gain of 
the same value, being therefore more willing to commit tax evasion than benefit fraud. For 
comparison purposes in what follows it is assumed that tax evasion and benefit fraud are equally 
risky so that  it is recognized that a full analysis of the putative financial gain from benefit fraud (0-
bf2) and the equal putative financial gain from tax evasion (0-te2) would involve an expected value 
calculation in the Kahneman and Tversky sense. However nothing is lost here by abstracting from 
this and making more direct comparisons.  
In Figure 1, the financial gain from benefit fraud (0-bf2) is coded as a foregone gain and is equal 
to the financial gain from tax evasion (0-te2) that is coded as an avoided loss. As tax evasion is coded 
as an avoided loss, the subjective value of the avoided loss from tax evasion for ‘private-person’ U 
(0-ve(U) at point 3) is greater than the subjective value of the foregone gain from benefit fraud (0-
vf(U)at point 1). 4  Similarly, ‘private-person’ I ‘s subjective value of the avoided loss from tax evasion 
                                                          
3  For the ‘public-citizen’, one interpretation of the value of tax evasion is premised on an ex-ante perspective. 
It is compensation required for what might have been; for the loss of revenue – a foregone gain. For benefit 
fraud, the value is premised on an ex-post perspective. It is the compensation required to accept the loss that 
has already taken place. It is also worth noting that there is often a difference in perceptions of ‘sins of 
omission’ and ‘sins of commission’. If tax evasion is an omission to pay taxes, benefit fraud is the commission 
of a crime to take revenue from the ‘public purse’. 
4  In the comments that individuals make in the popular press there is evidence of this difference in the 
perceptions that individuals report of these two crimes. Consider a letter published in the Daily Telegraph 
25/6/12 (under the heading ‘Avoiding tax is not morally equivalent to committing benefit fraud’). The author 
questions the proposition that ‘tax dodgers’ and ‘benefit cheats’ are equivalent: “The first group is trying to 
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(0-ve(I) at point 4) is lower than the subjective value of the foregone gain from benefit fraud (0-vf(I) 
at point 2). From the ‘private-person’ viewpoint taking risk in failing to add to the ‘public purse’ (an 
avoided loss) offers greater subjective value than taking the risk of a conspiracy to take resources out 
of the ‘public purse’. The prediction is that from a ‘private-person’ perspective risky tax evasion has 
more subjective value to offer than equivalent risky benefit fraud. 
(iv)  Individuals’ attitudes and reported behavior with respect to public finance crimes are 
likely to be conditioned on the salience individuals attach to government revenue and on 
how widespread they perceive such illegal behaviour to be. 
 At this point the analysis focuses on comparisons across individuals (comparisons that 
condition the general observations (i) – (iii) on country of origin). In this paper the empirical analysis 
is of a ‘representative’ individual (U) in the United Kingdom and a ‘representative’ individual (I) in 
Italy. Hence the different locations of the two value functions in Figure 1.  
It is important to consider the difference in the austerity programs introduced to reduce 
government deficits. Italy was engaged in a far more severe program. On the 14th May 2012, the 
Daily Telegraph (p.4) reported that:  “Soldiers may be brought in to protect Italian tax offices and 
other sensitive sites after an increase in violence as the country struggles through austerity 
measures”. With these differences in recent experience, Italians are likely to attach greater salience 
to the state of their public finances. Figure 1 illustrates two conventionally-shaped value functions. 
The value function for individual I is the value function of an individual who displays a more salient 
concern for the plight of the public finances (when comparing this value function with the value 
function that is illustrated for individual U).   Italy was one of the four nation states in the Eurozone 
perceived to have very weak public finances (the others were Portugal, Greece and Spain).5 The 
implication is that Italians are likely to perceive public finance crimes as more serious and as more 
prevalent in their countries (than their UK counterparts).  
With evidence that salience matters when individuals respond to potential changes in their 
financial circumstances (see Bordalo et al., 2012), how will this difference in salience influence 
attitudes and behavior in Italy and in the UK? 6 There are two predictions.  
First, as public finance is a more salient concern in Italy, Italians attach greater importance to 
changes in the public purse. As ‘public-citizen’ observers of crimes, the value of ‘loss’ (when there is 
benefit fraud), and of foregone gain (when there is tax evasion), will be higher in Italy than in the UK 
(as reflected in the locations of v(I) and v(U) in Figure 1).  As observers of the crimes, Italians will be 
more condemnatory of both crimes than citizens in the UK (more willing to report offenders and 
more likely to call for harsher punishments).  
                                                          
prevent an institution forcibly taking money that they themselves have earned. The second group is trying to 
con money that they do nothing to deserve. How is that equivalent?” 
5 Italy provides the ‘I’ for the economies dubbed the PIGS in the Eurozone. The salience of public finance 
crimes was very high in all these economies. In May 2012, Christine Lagarde (Managing Director of the IMF) 
speaking about the Greeks is reported as saying: “I think they should also help themselves collectively." Asked 
how, she replied: "By all paying their tax." Asked if she was essentially saying to the Greeks and others in 
Europe that they have had a nice time and it is now payback time, she responded: "That's right." 
6 Bordalo et. al. (2012) employ salience to replace Kahneman and Tversky’s decision weights with ones based 
on the salience of payoffs in lotteries, while here it is the other arm of Prospect Theory – the value function- 
that is deemed subject to salience effects. 
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Second, the same difference in salience (the same difference in the location of v(I) and v(U)) 
means that Italians are also likely to be more willing to commit these crimes. As the state of the 
public finances is more salient in the lives of Italians, Italians attach a higher subjective value to the 
proceeds of fiscal crime. The paradox is that Italians are more likely to be condemnatory and more 
likely to commit these crimes (than citizens in the UK). 7 Early indications of the paradox that has 
been identified in this paper can be found in Alm and Torgler study (2006). They focused on 
questionnaire responses in the World Values Survey to plot the relationship between tax morale and 
the size of the shadow economy in different countries. Results showed that the shadow economy in 
Italy in the 1990s was estimated to be far higher than anticipated with reference to Italians’ 
responses to the question of whether cheating on tax can be justified or not (their tax morality). 
Moreover, the study shows that, despite Italy and the UK presenting a similar level of tax morality, in 
Italy the size of shadow economy was much greater than in the UK. It suggests that tax morality 
alone (and attitudes towards fiscal crimes) cannot entirely explain willingness to commit such 
crimes. A possible explanation is that the different perception of how widespread a behavior is – 
although illegal – might lead people to be more willing to commit it, even if they recognize it is 
wrong (since “everyone else is doing it”). Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) provide early econometric 
evidence that the number of others who are tax evaders that are known to an individual make 
evasion more likely and in this way social norms cannot be ignored. 
To summarize, the research objectives are to assess whether there are differences in:  
(i) Attitudes to different crimes: Are reported acts of benefit fraud always perceived to be 
‘more wrong’ than reported acts of tax evasion? 
(ii) Attitudes in different countries: Are reported acts of benefit fraud and tax evasion 
perceived to be ‘more serious’ in Italy than in the UK (because public finance concerns 
are more salient in Italy) – implying that Italians are harsher gamekeepers? 
(iii) Willingness to commit crimes: If individuals are more condemnatory of benefit fraud 
than tax evasion are they less willing to commit benefit fraud than tax evasion? Are 
Italians more condemnatory of both crimes and more likely to commit both crimes 
(because public finance concerns are more salient in their lives and fiscal offences are 
perceived as more widespread) - implying that would-be poachers are harsher 
gamekeepers? 
 
 
3. Method 
3.1 Materials and Design 
A questionnaire was designed to shed insight into individuals’ perceptions of tax evasion and 
benefit fraud (of equal pecuniary value).8 The objective was to compare attitudes and reported 
behavior.  How are crimes perceived? How important is the salience of public finance in countries 
that have experienced a pronounced fiscal crisis? How important is the perceived prevalence of 
illegal fiscal behaviors? 
                                                          
7 Halla and Schneider (2014) also argue that personal experience affects attitudes to public finance crimes; 
high-income earners are more likely to condemn benefit fraud and low-income citizens are more likely to 
condemn tax evasion. In this paper, the argument is that individuals’ experience is relevant when assessing the 
likelihood that they will commit both crimes. The more salient the state of the public finances, the more they 
are willing to commit public finance crimes and the more they condemn the crimes of others. 
8 The questionnaire is available from the authors on request. 
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The pecuniary values in this paper were premised on the values that were cited in the UK 
Cabinet Office Report, Tackling Fraud and Error in Government.  The 2012 Report estimates an 
annual loss of £31 billion in the UK (costing every man, woman and child £500). Hence £500 was 
chosen as the gain in ‘short term’ /monthly scenarios and £6,000 for the ‘long term’/ annual 
scenarios.  As there was rough parity between the Euro and the GB Pound at the time of data 
collection, these figures were the same in the Italian version of the questionnaire.  The scenarios 
relevant to the current analysis are reproduced in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 near here] 
The first scenario in each block related to tax evasion (TE) and the second and third to 
benefit fraud (BF). In all cases respondents were asked to tick a box corresponding to a four point 
scale as to whether they considered the activity  ‘1, Not wrong’ to ‘4, Seriously wrong’ and what the 
appropriate fine should be. They were also asked whether they would engage in the activity or not 
themselves, from ‘1, Very Likely’ to ‘4, Not at all likely’. Finally, they were asked how prevalent they 
believed benefit fraud and tax evasion was in their own country and whether they would report 
observed illegal activities to the authorities.   
3.2  Participants and Procedure 
 Questionnaires were completed in Psychology classes and in Economics classes at the 
University of Bath, U.K. and at the Università Cattolica, Milan, Italy (with opportunity sampling). The 
questionnaires were completed individually and anonymity was assured. The procedure was 
administered by the authors.  
Country of origin was asked in the questionnaire and non-national students were subsequently 
excluded from the analysis. Out of 360 collected questionnaires in the UK, 234 respondents were 
British (65%). Of the 234 British students in the UK, 120 were male and 114 were female. Of these 
141 were undergraduate Economics students and 93 were undergraduate Psychology students. A 
carefully translated questionnaire was distributed in Italy. As for the Italian sample, 100% 
respondents were of Italian nationality. The Italian sample comprised 205 students (25 male and 180 
female). Of these 82 were undergraduate Economics students and 123 were undergraduate 
Psychology students. Given the sizeable differences between the UK and Italian samples in terms of 
gender and subject of study, these latter two variables were included as covariates in statistical 
analyses involving country as an independent variable. Table 2 provides a further description of the 
composition of the sample. 
  
[Insert Table 2 near here] 
 
4. Data and Results   
The key results are presented in the sub-sections below. For each statistical analysis performed, only  
the most relevant results referring to the research objectives listed in section 2 are discussed. But 
what of the basic data? Table 3 describes the distribution of responses to questions (across the scale 
that was employed in the questionnaire)9.   
                                                          
9 Tables that describe the correlations between responses to the questions are available from the authors on request. 
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[Insert Table 3 near here] 
The summary reponses to the various questions concerning public finance crimes are presented in 
Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 near here] 
Considering Table 4, the summary data reveals evidence on the seriousness with which the 
different public sector crimes are viewed by respondents– their ‘value assignment’ as reflected in 
suggested fines  (columns (1) and (5)) – respondents’ attitudes towards the crimes described  -
‘wrongness’ columns (3) and (7) - and willingness to commit the crimes themselves – potential 
criminal behaviour (columns 4 and 8). The ‘wrongness’ percentage is a head count of those 
responding ‘wrong’ and ‘seriously wrong’ in their questionnaire. The ‘would you do it’ percentage is 
a head count of those responding ‘very likely’ and ’fairly likely’ in their questionnaire.The results 
appear consistent with the analysis presented in section 2 of the paper. The salience argument gains 
support as Italian students see the crimes as more serious, consistently suggesting higher fines and 
higher percentages of fine to the proceeds from crime (see columns (2) and (6)). Italians seem to 
present as more harsh gamekeepers.  
As roles switch from ‘gamekeeping’ to ‘poaching’, so do attitudes and possible behaviour. 
‘Wrongness’ percentages are mixed 3 v 3 in terms of relative magnitudes. As regards ‘likely to do it’, 
Italians consistently report higher ‘likely’ percentages. Italians seem to present as more likely 
poachers. But can this picture sustain statistical scrutiny? 
4.1 Differences in attitudes, fines and behaviour towards fiscal offences 
 A repeated measures MANOVA (3x2x2) was conducted (3 different scenarios within subjects 
x 2 offence duration intervals within subjects x 2 countries between subjects, gender and degree of 
the participants as covariates). Table 5 describes the entire MANOVA results along with all 
the associated 3x2x2 ANOVA results, both the main and the interaction effects. It shows a significant 
multivariate main effect for the three dependent variables (attitudes, fines and behaviour) as a 
group in relation to fiscal offence , offence duration (p<.001) and country of origin. Also the 
interaction effects between fiscal offence and offence duration, fiscal offence and country of origin, 
offence duration and country of origin were significant. The main and interaction effects of the 
repeated measure MANOVA (3x2x2) are detailed in the subsections below. 
[Insert Table 5 near here] 
[Insert Table 6 near here] 
[Insert Table 7 near here] 
4.1.1 Repeated measures MANOVA – main effects 
First, the main effects of the analysis are considered. Univariate analyses (see Table 5) show 
that there are differences between the fiscal offences studied, both in relation to attitudes (how 
wrong they are perceived), fines (the level of appropriate punishment) and behaviour (the likeliness 
to commit the crimes). Comparisons (see Table 6) and estimated means (see Table 7) reveal that 
participants are more condemnatory of benefit fraud than of tax evasion, call for higher 
punishments for benefit fraud than for tax evasion, and are more likely to commit tax evasion than 
benefit fraud – which are consistent judgements. The results are in line with Prospect Theory, as 
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illustrated in section 2. However, comparisons show that there is something else. Differences can be 
found also between the two different benefit fraud offences (unemployment and injury), where 
participants are more condemnatory of injury benefit fraud than of unemployment benefit fraud, 
calling for higher punishment for injury benefit fraud than for unemployment benefit fraud, and are 
more likely to commit unemployment benefit fraud than injury benefit fraud. Such differences 
cannot be entirely explained by Prospect Theory (both being offences classified as benefit fraud), but 
need to take into account other psychological factors, such as people’s morals (i.e. falsely claiming to 
be injured is more serious than falsely claiming to be unemployed) or the different perception of the 
prevalence of such crimes.   
Moving to the univariate analyses for the effect of offence duration, results show that if a 
fiscal offence is repeated for a longer and continuous period of time (thus involving a larger amount 
of money), both the negative attitude and the appropriate punishment increases, while the likeliness 
to do it decreases (as might be anticipated). 
Finally, univariate analyses for the effect of country of origin significantly predicted 
responses related to fines  and behaviour, not to attitudes. More specifically, Italian participants call 
for higher punishments for fiscal offences than English participants, but at the same time Italians are 
more willing to commit them (although Italians consider them as wrong as English participants do- 
see row C Table 5). This result is in line with the hypothesis that would be poachers make more 
harsh gamekeepers. Interestingly, despite the diffences in fines and behaviour,  Italian and English 
participants share the same attitude towards fiscal offences. This is in line with Alm and Torgler’s 
study (2006), who registered a similar degree of tax morale for Italy and UK.   
4.1.2 Repeated measures MANOVA – interaction effects 
Moving to the interaction effects, Table 5 shows that many of them are significant but here 
the concentration is on those relevant to the task at hand. Table 6 and Table 7 illustrate respectively 
comparisons and estimated means for all interaction effects.  
The significant interaction effect between fiscal offence and country of origin indicates that, 
in a context where benefit fraud is generally perceived as more wrong than evasion, Italians perceive 
tax evasion as more wrong than English people do. Moreover, Italians are more harsh gamekeepers 
regardless of the kind of fiscal offence (note the lack of significant interaction effects for fines). As for 
their likeliness to commit fiscal offences, although Italians are generally more willing to misbehave, 
they especially have a proclivity for unemployment benefit fraud. This might be – at least partially – 
explained by the difficult situation experienced by Italian participants at the time of the collection of 
data, where youth unemployemnt had just hit 31% (10% higher than the average level in the 
Eurozone). 
As for the interaction effect between country of origin and duration of the offence, it is worth 
noting that Italians become even more harsh gamekeepers for long-term offences. 
4.2 Differences in Prevalence and Reporting 
 Italian respondents believe that both tax evasion and benefit fraud are more prevalent, 
estimating that, on average, 41% of the Italian population are engaged in benefit fraud (UK 32%) and 
a majority (53%) in tax evasion (UK 28%). When employing a MANOVA test (country of origin as the 
independent variable, gender and degree of the participants as covariates), a significant mutivariate 
effect (F(2,426)=80.51, p<.001, η2=.30) indicates that these public finance crimes are perceived as 
more widespread in Italy than in the UK. Univariate tests support this evidence both for tax evasion 
(F(1,427)=154.85, p<.001, η2=.27) and for benefit fraud (F(1,427)=18.07, p<.001, η2=.04). The different 
10 
 
perceptions of how such illegal behaviours are widespread in UK and Italy must not be 
underestimated. Interestingly, only behaviours (neither attitudes nor suggested fines) are 
systematically and significantly correlated to perceived prevalence, both in relation to tax evasion 
(paid500: r=.19, p<.001; paid 6000: r=.21, p<.001) and to benefit fraud (unempl500: r=.19, p<.001; 
unempl6000: r=.22, p<.001; injury500: r=.10, p<.05; injury6000: r=.13, p<.01). This might help to 
explain why Italians declare to be more willing to commit fiscal offence than English people (because 
“everyone else is doing it”). 
 The paradox is that, while Italians are more willing to engage in public finance crime (as 
discussed in paragraph 4.1.1), they are also more likely to report the misdemeanours of others to the 
authorities, as suggested by a one-way MANOVA (country of origin as the independent variable, 
gender and degree of the participants as covariates, willingness to report tax evasion and benefit fraud 
as dependent variables). A significant multivariate effect (F(2,431)=19.76, p<.001, η2=.08) indicates 
that the Italian sample is generally more willing to report illegal behaviors to the authorities; the 
univariate effects confirm the existence of a statistically significant difference both for tax evasion 
(F(1,432)=31.42, p<.001, η2=.07) and benefit fraud (F(1,432)=30.76, p<.001, η2=.07). The estimated 
marginal means (with degree=.49 and gender=.67) for reporting tax evasion and benefit fraud are 
respectively: UK=2.9 compared to Italy=2.4, and UK=2.4 compared to Italy=1.8 (the lower the score 
the greater agreement with reporting). 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Are these results consistent with behavioral insights presented in section 2 of the paper? 
‘Value coding’, suggesting that (in general) ‘public- citizen’- individuals are more condemnatory of 
benefit fraud than tax evasion, is well supported by the data. The prediction about ‘seriousness’ (as 
reflected in the suggestion of higher appropriate fines for benefit fraud than tax evasion) also finds 
support. Section 2 pointed out the likely differences between the Italian and UK representative 
individual, arising because of salience and suggested that: (a) Italians would perceive a greater 
prevalence of public finance crimes; (b) be more willing to report and harshly punish such crimes and 
(c) paradoxically, be more willing to commit such crimes. This prompted the question posed in the 
title to this paper. In a direct answer to the question, Italians appear to be the more likely poachers 
and are more likely to be harsh gamekeepers.   
On the evidence presented here, against a background of a common view of ‘wrongness’, 
Italians nevertheless differentially: perceive a greater prevalence of public finance crimes; suggest 
higher fines for public-finance crimes and are more likely to report someone cheating ‘the system’ to 
the authorities, but at the same time they say they are more likely to cheat themselves.  There 
seems to be a clear dichotomy between what they wish for themselves in a ‘private-person’ role and 
what they wish for others in a  ‘public-citizen’ role – a prisoner’s dilemma. 
When reflecting on this conclusion, the first question is whether it is consistent with other 
observations in this literature. While the literature on tax evasion is prolific (see Kirchler 2007 for a 
relatively recent survey), the literature on benefit fraud is sparse.  When scholars attempt to explain 
higher levels of tax compliance than predicted by neoclassical economics (Andreoni, Erard and 
Feinstein 1998), they argue that tax morale reduces the likelihood that individuals will evade. Tax 
morale is defined as an individual’s motivation not to cheat the government by evading tax (see, for 
example, Torgler 2003). In the same vein, benefit morale is a motivation that reduces the likelihood 
that individuals will engage in fraud. Heinemann (2008) and Halla, Lackner and Schneider (2010) 
question the impact that high levels of social spending and high unemployment rates exert on 
benefit morale. Halla, Lackner and Schneider (2010:71) conclude that “…negative macroeconomic 
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shocks not only increase the share of the population living on benefit per se, but in addition a 
deterioration of benefit morale has to be expected”.  The observation is that both benefit morale 
and tax morale are likely to be influenced by economic variables. Halla and Schneider (2014) argue 
that non-employed citizens are far more likely to ‘demand’ high tax morale and far less likely to 
‘demand’ high benefit morale (than employed citizens). The authors conclude that “…citizens self-
servingly adjust their moral values” (p.18). A similar interpretation might apply when reflecting on 
the results that are reported in this paper.  As observers of public finance crimes, citizens are 
indignant but they are quite able to adjust when offered the opportunity to commit these crimes.  
The second question to consider (when reflecting on these conclusions) is whether there are any 
implications for policies designed to deter tax evasion and policies designed to deter benefit fraud. 
Economists argue that policy to deter tax evasion is ‘optimal’ if the marginal cost of resources 
employed to deter tax evasion equals the marginal benefit of deterrence. If policy is designed to 
maximize revenue, the marginal benefit is the incremental value of recoverable tax revenue (e.g. 
Collard 1989).  The same analysis could apply when designing policy to deter benefit fraud; policy is 
‘optimal’ when the marginal cost of resources equals the incremental value of recoverable revenue 
made available for legitimate government expenditure. In neoclassical economics money is fungible 
(a pound of revenue recovered by action that deters tax evasion is equal to a pound of revenue that 
deters benefit fraud). However in this paper the evidence is that, pound for pound, the value loss 
experienced from benefit fraud is higher than the loss from tax evasion.  There is a rationale to incur 
additional costs to deter one pound/euro of benefit fraud (as compared to the marginal cost they 
incur to deter one pound/euro of evaded tax).  If governments design deterrence policy to 
maximise political popularity and, in this way, to maximise  'value' (rather than revenue10), the 
marginal benefit of deterring benefit fraud appears to be higher than the marginal benefit of 
deterring tax evasion. In other words, from the ‘public-citizens’ perspective if the government 
collects an additional  pound/euro by fighting benefit fraud, it is more valuable than collecting a 
pound/euro by fighting tax evasion, as it would allow ‘public-citizens’ to avoid a loss. 
The empirical work reported above is based on student responses, and this calls in question the 
extent to which the analysis applies more generally. Having said this, the responses and cognitive 
processes of students are seldom that different to those of ‘normal’ people (see for example Plott 
1987). The analysis in this paper is consistent with the propositions that sins of omission are 
perceived to be different to sins of commission, and that national differences in these perceptions 
are relevant when designing policies to deter tax evasion and benefit fraud. 
                                                          
10 For an application of  Prospect Theory to the trade-off ‘economic value vs. political consensus’ within fiscal policies, see  
Lozza, Carrera & Bosio, 2010. 
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Table 1.  Short and long term scenarios (offence duration) 
SCENARIO (short term) SCENARIO (long term) 
Paid500. A person in a paid work paying tax 
takes an extra weekend job for a month and is 
paid in cash. He does not declare it for tax and 
so is £500 in pocket. 
Paid6000. A person in a paid work paying tax 
takes an extra weekend job for a year and is 
paid in cash. He does not declare it for tax and 
so is £6000 in pocket. 
Unemp500. An unemployed person on state 
benefit takes a casual job for a month and is 
paid in cash. He does not report it to the 
benefit office and so is £500 in pocket. 
Unemp6000. An unemployed person on state 
benefit takes a casual job for a year and is paid 
in cash. He does not report it to the benefit 
office and so is £6000 in pocket. 
Injury500. A person has been receiving £500 
extra state benefit per month since a back 
injury stopped him working. Even though in the 
past month he has been well enough to do 
some types of full-time work he does not tell 
the benefit office and is £500 in pocket. 
Injury6000. A person has been receiving £6000 
extra state benefit per month since a back 
injury stopped him working. Even though in the 
past year he has been well enough to do some 
types of full-time work he does not tell the 
benefit office and is £6000 in pocket.  
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Table 2. The sample: descriptive statistics 
Degree Frequency Percent 
Economics  223 50.8 
Psychology  216 49.2 
Total 439 100.0 
Gender Frequency Percent 
Male 146 33.1 
Female 293 66.9 
Total 439 100.0 
Country of Origin Frequency Percent 
UK 234 53.3 
Italy 205 46.7 
Total 439 100.0 
Age Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total (N=436) 17 28 20.92 2.04 
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Table 3. The responses: descriptive statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean  
Standard 
Deviation  
      
Attitude 
      
Paid500 439 1 4 2.23 .811 
Paid6000  437 1 4 2.90 .808 
Unempl500 437 1 4 2.80 .906 
Unemploy6000 437 1 4 3.29 .777 
Injury500 437 1 4 3.12 .747 
Injury6000 439 1 4 3.53 .611 
Valid N (listwise) 436         
      
Behaviour 
      
Paid 500do 439 1 4 2.05 .899 
Paid 6000do 436 1 4 2.86 .918 
Unempl5000do 437 1 4 2.73 1.037 
Unemploy6000do 437 1 4 3.24 .900 
Injury500do 437 1 4 3.22 .858 
Injury6000do 439 1 4 3.60 .654 
Valid N (listwise) 435         
      
Fine 
      
Paid500fine 405 0 20000 527.24 1496.52 
Paid6000fine 402 0 60000 3944.73 6946.69 
Unemploy500fine 395 0 20000 747.01 1796.63 
Unemploy6000fine 400 0 120000 5558.48 11008.04 
Injury500fine 397 0 50000 1247.34 4058.82 
Injury6000fine 399 0 100000 6435.16 12128.17 
Valid N (listwise) 383 0       
      
Reporting 
      
Report TaxEvasion 438 1 5 2.66 .987 
Report Benefit Fraud 436 1 5 2.13 .967 
Valid N (listwise) 436         
      
Prevalence 
      
tax__evasion 434 .0 100 39.54 23.15 
benefit_fraud 433 .0 100 35.78 20.84 
Valid N (listwise) 431         
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Table 4. The summary responses on seriousness, attitude and behaviour towards public finance crime 
 
 
UK data Italian data 
 Game keeping Poaching Game keeping Poaching 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Mean 
fine 
% fine Is it 
wrong? 
Would you 
do it? (likely) 
Mean 
fine 
% fine Is it 
wrong? 
Would you 
do it? (likely) 
(GB 
Pounds) 
 (yes) 
(%) 
(%) (Euros)  (yes) 
(%) 
(%) 
Short term 
scenario 
Seriousness Attitude Behaviour Seriousness Attitude Behaviour 
           
Paid500 (TE) 352 70 29 64 758 152 44 77 
Unemp500 
(BF) 
692 138 74 27 821 164 57 60 
Injury500 (BF) 1164 233 83 12 1361 272 81 25 
         
Long term 
scenario 
Seriousness Attitude Behaviour Seriousness Attitude Behaviour 
           
Paid6000 (TE) 3067 51 72 25 5130 85 75 37 
Unemp6000 
(BF) 
4988 83 91 9 6331 106 80 27 
Injury6000 (BF) 5382 90 95 5 7868 131 96 7 
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Table 5. Repeated measures MANOVA (3x2x2) 
    
MANOVA 
  Attitudes   Fines   Behavior 
   Univariate analyses  Univariate analyses  Univariate analyses 
Effects   F df p η
2   F df p η
2   F Df p η
2   F df p η
2 
                     
One-way effects                     
A - fiscal offence  36.641 6, 374 *** .37  59.361 2, 758 *** .13  15.210 2, 758 *** .04  114.090 2, 758 *** .23 
B - time interval  78.735 3, 377 *** .38  89.859 1, 379 *** .19  93.802 1, 379 *** .20  133.284 1, 379 *** .26 
C - country of origin 24.526 3. 377 *** .16  0.766 1, 379 n.s. -  13.161 1, 379 *** .03  35.644 1,379 *** .09 
                     
One-way effects                     
AxB  8.457 6, 374 *** .12  9.946 2, 758 *** .30  10.526 2, 758 *** .03  16.338 2, 758 *** .04 
BxC  8.768 3, 377 *** .06  7.005 1, 758 ** .02  12.294 1, 758 ** .03  0.407 1, 758 n.s. - 
AxC  10.885 6, 374 *** .15  17.645 2, 758 *** .04  0.780 2, 758 n.s. -  12.624 2, 758 *** .03 
                     
Three-way effect                     
AxBxC   2.080 6, 374 n.s. -   2.738 2, 758 n.s. -   0.676 2, 758 n.s. -   4.806 2, 758 * .01 
**= p<.01                     
***=p<.001                     
Covariates in the model are evaluated at the following values: Degree = .48 and Gender = .64         
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Table 6. Repeated measures MANOVA (3x2x2) - Planned contrasts 
      Attitudes 
  
Fines 
  
Behavior 
   F df p η2   F df P η2   F df p η2 
Fiscal offence 
TE  vs. BF (unempl)  52.441 1, 379 *** .12  12.985 1, 379 *** .03  59.880 1, 379 *** .14 
TE vs. BF (injury)  102.653 1, 379 *** .21  19.581 1, 379 *** .05  205.470 1, 379 *** .35 
BF (unempl) vs. BF 
(injury) 
 14.233 1, 379 *** .04  7.196 1, 379 ** .02  61.315 1, 379 *** .14 
                 
Fiscal offence x 
Time interval 
TE  vs. BF (unempl)  4.328 1, 379 * .01  13.966 1, 379 *** .04  6.369 1, 379 * .02 
TE vs. BF (injury)  19.068 1, 379 *** .05  11.587 1, 379 ** .03  30.373 1, 379 *** .07 
BF (unempl) vs. BF 
(injury) 
 5.914 1, 379 * .01  .037 1, 379 n.s. -  10.888 1, 379 ** .03 
                 
Fiscal offence x 
Country of origin 
TE  vs. BF (unempl)  36.772 1, 379 *** .09  .020 1, 379 n.s. -  13.709 1, 379 *** .03 
TE vs. BF (injury)  9.522 1, 379 ** .02  .669 1, 379 n.s. -  .704 1, 379 n.s. - 
BF (unempl) vs. BF 
(injury) 
 7.689 1, 379 ** .02  2.247 1, 379 n.s. -  27.426 1, 379 *** .07 
                 
Fiscal offence x 
Time interval x 
Country of origin 
TE  vs. BF (unempl)  5.110 1, 379 * .01  .334 1, 379 n.s. -  7.729 1, 379 ** .02 
TE vs. BF (injury)  .436 1, 379 n.s. -  1.027 1, 379 n.s. -  .039 1, 379 n.s. - 
BF (unempl) vs. BF 
(injury) 
  2.730 1, 379 n.s. -   .558 1, 379 n.s. -   7.158 1, 379 ** .02 
*= p<.05           
**=p<.01             
***=p<.001                 
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Table 7. Repeated measures MANOVA (3x2x2) - Estimated marginal means 
 
                  
    Attitudes   Fines   Behaviour 
A - fiscal offence 
TE   2.58  2370  2.44 
BF (unempl)   3.05  3324  2.97 
BF (injury)   3.36  4022  3.43 
         
B - time interval 
Short term   2.73  878  2.66 
Long term   3.26  5599  3.23 
         
C - country of origin 
UK   3.02  2217  3.15 
Italy   2.97  4260  2.74 
         
Interactions         
AxB 
TE 
 Short term 2.25  571  2.03 
 Long term 2.92  4168  2.85 
BF (unempl) 
 Short term 2.80  763  2.70 
 Long term 3.31  5885  3.24 
BF (injury) 
 Short term 3.16  1300  3.25 
 Long term 3.55  6745  3.61 
         
BxC 
UK 
  Short term 2.73   634   2.88 
  Long term 3.32   3800   3.43 
Italy 
  Short term 2.74   1122   2.44 
  Long term 3.20   7398   3.03 
         
AxC 
TE 
 UK 2.48  1432  2.60 
 Italy 2.69  3307  2.27 
BF (unempl) 
 UK 3.20  2425  3.30 
 Italy 2.90  4223  2.63 
BF (injury) 
 UK 3.39  2794  3.56 
 Italy 3.32  5251  3.30 
            
Attitudes: 'Do you feel this is wrong or not wrong?' (1=Not wrong; 4=Seriously 
wrong)    
Fines: 'How much do you think an appropriate fine should be for someone doing this?'   
Behaviour: 'Would you do this?' (1=Very likely; 4=Not at all likely)     
21 
 
 
